I. INTRODUCTION
In Reno v. ACLU,' the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996.2 Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act (CDA) in order to curtail the dissemination of pornography to minors via the Internet. 3 The Court found two provisions of the CDA to be unconstitutional due to their vagueness and the chilling effect their application would have on Internet communications. 4 This Note concludes that the Court's holding was correct in light of established First Amendment precedent. The Court's application of strict scrutiny 5 was proper given the importance of the right to free expression. While the Government has a legitimate and compelling interest in protecting minors from sexually explicit material that may be harmful to them, 6 the CDA was not narrowly tailored to conform to the Government's 7 narrow prerogative in this area.
This Note argues that any future attempt to regulate sexually explicit Internet transmissions must be drafted with sufficient specificity such that no ambiguity exists as to the scope of its enforcement. 8 This Note also rejects the Government's stance that regulation of Internet pornography is justified as an exercise of its zoning power. The interpretation of the CDA under a zoning paradigm undermines the foundations of free expression and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has struggled to prevent access by minors to speech that may harm them, while safeguarding the First Amendment right of adults to engage in nonobscene speech. The Court has addressed the constitutionality of restricting the rights of minors to access constitutionally protected speech 0 in a variety of fora." Generally, the Court measures the Government's interest in protecting minors from harmful speech relative to the ease with which minors can access that speech.
A. RELEVANT PRECEDENT
Unprotected Speech
It is well established that the Government lawfully may impose different regulations on minors than it does on adults. In Ginsberg v. New York,' 2 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute 3 forbidding the sale to minors under age seventeen of material considered obscene as to them, although not necessarily obscene for adults. 4 However, the Government does not have unlimited regulatory powers to protect minors. When a statute has the effect of restricting adults to viewing only material suitable for children, it will be stricken down. 5 The Supreme Court views obscenity as completely outside the scope of the First Amendment's protection, and the Government may regulate speech freely as long as the Miller test is fulfilled. 23 
Regulation of Speech on Particular Media
Furthermore, the fact that speech is not obscene is not necessarily sufficient to preclude Government regulation. The Supreme Court has allowed the Government to restrict speech in various media where the fundamental nature of the media make such restrictions acceptable. 24 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court held that the radio broadcast of a monologue entitled Filthy Words, previously delivered to a live audience by comedian George Carlin, "'could have been the subject of administrative sanctions.' 26 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) determined that the monologue was patently offensive and indecent as aired, 27 because it involved the repeated use of words referring to excretory or sexual activities or organs "in an afternoon broadcast when children are in the audience." 28 The Pacifica plurality stated that regulation dependent on the content of speech does not violate the First Amendment per se. 29 Instead, the context of the broadcast is critical in determining the scope of constitutional protection. 24 See e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 Ct. , 2386 Ct. -87 (1996 (leased cable television channels may be regulated, but not public access channels); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U. S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (radio) . But see Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-28 (1989) 
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However, in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 33 the Supreme Court refused to uphold a ban on indecent "dial-aporn" telephone communications.3 Sable Communications, a provider of sexually oriented prerecorded messages, brought suit to enjoin enforcement of 47 U.S.C. § 223(b).s The 1988 amendment to § 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 created an outright ban on indecent or obscene interstate commercial telephone messages.-Applying strict scrutiny, the Court found that the statute was not sufficiently narrowly drawn to serve the Government's compelling interest in protecting minors. s7 Furthermore, the Court distinguished Pacifica on the basis that it involved the unique attributes of broadcasting, and did not mandate a complete ban. s In Pacifica, there was a risk that listeners would hear Carlin's monologue by accident. In contrast, the probability that one would fortuitously encounter an indecent telephone message is reduced substantially by the affirmative steps one must take to access those messages.
Most recently, in Denver Area Education Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 40 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of three portions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,' 41 each attempting to regulate programming on cable television. 2 The first of these regulations, § 10(a), allowed cable operators to ban patently offensive material on leased access channels. 3 The second, § 10(c), authorized the same bans for public access channels." If cable operators did not take advantage of these 492 U.S. 115 (1989) .
at 131. 39 Id. at 127-28. '0 116 S. Ct. 2374 Ct. (1996 . 4, 106 Stat. 1486 § § 10(a)-(c) (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § § 532(h), 532(j), and note following § 531 (Supp. 1997) 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW provisions, § 10(b) mandated that they place all patently offensive programming on a single channel, and only allow customers to access that channel after providing written authorization. 45 The Denver AreaJustices could not settle upon a single level of scrutiny to apply, and the Court's decision came down as a patchwork of shifting pluralities. When the dust settled, the leased access provision ( § 10(a)) was held constitutional, 46 the public access provision ( § 10(c)) was held unconstitutional, 47 and the provision mandating segregation of patently offensive material ( § 10(b)) also was held unconstitutional.
4 ' Denver Area clearly illustrates the Court's continuing willingness to engage in medium-specific analysis-evaluating regulations within the context of the medium affected and adjusting the standard of review accordingly. 
Content-Neutral Regulations
Using a wholly different mode of analysis, the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that prevented adult movie theaters from opening in residential neighborhoods in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 50 The Court acknowledged the district court's finding that the ordinance was aimed not at the content of the films shown in the theaters, but rather at the impact such establishments have on their surrounding neighborhood, including rising crime rates and deteriorating property values.
'
The Court upheld the statute, holding that a state has a legitimate See 47 U.S.C. § 532(j) (Supp. 1997) . Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2390 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion); id. at 2417 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17 Id. at 2394 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion); id. at 2417 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" ' Id. at 2394 (BreyerJ., plurality opinion 41, 54-55 (1986) . See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding two Detroit zoning laws preventing adult theaters from being constructed near each other or residential neighborhoods).
-" Renton, 475 U.S. at 48. 1020 [Vol. 88 interest in protecting property values and discouraging crime, and therefore may proscribe speech to serve these interests as long as the content of the restricted speech is not considered.
52
The Court was explicit in limiting its holding only to statutes that combat the "secondary effects" of speech without regard to its content.
53
Had the regulation instead been found to be "contentbased," firmly established principles would have made it presumptively invalid. Six years later, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 54 the Court addressed a St. Paul ordinance 55 proscribing the use of symbolic speech, "which one knows or has a reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender .. .
The defendant was prosecuted for burning a cross in the yard of an African-American family. 5 7 The Court struck down the ordinance, noting that it allowed individuals to engage in insulting or violence-provoking speech as long as such speech was not directed to one of the enumerated disfavored topics. Justice Scalia stated that "[tihe First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed." 5 9 Thus, in order to survive constitutional review, a statute restricting protected speech must be directed at factors extrinsic to the content of the message, rather than at the viewpoint expressed. 6°B . THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCYACT OF 1996 Against this backdrop of First Amendment case law, 6 ' Congress passed the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or (2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (Supp. 1997).
those who make "good faith" and "effective" efforts to restrict access by minors to prohibited communications. 67 Senator James Exon (D-Neb.) originally proposed the CDA in 1 9 9 5 .68 Despite some resistance to the indecency provisions, Senator Exon and a coalition of right-wing and antipornography groups were able to maintain the bill in its original form. 6 9 In an 84 to 16 vote, the Exon amendment was attached to the Senate's telecommunications bill in June of 1995.70 However, the House version of the legislation expressly prohibited Internet censorship and was passed by a 420 to 4 vote. 7 In the joint conference committee, the House participants abandoned their measure and adopted Senator Exon's proposal. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority treated the section as consisting of only one "patently offensive display," provision, thereby avoiding the issue of a transmission purposefully directed at a known minor. Id. at 2338 n.25.
'7 Section 223(e) (5) provides that: It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a) (1) (B) or (d) of this section, or under subsection (a) (2) of this section with respect to the use of a facility for an activity under subsection (a) (1) (B) of this section that a person-(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication specified in such subsections, which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such communications, including any method which is feasible under available technology; or (B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e) (5) (Supp. 1997).
SeeS. No single person or organization controls or administers the Internet-it exists because individuals have chosen voluntarily to use common data transfer protocols to transmit information. 7 There is no single point at which the Internet is administered, and it would be technically infeasible for any entity to control the enormous amount of information transmitted over the system. 78 Users can access the Internet either by connecting to the network on a personal computer through a modem, or by using a computer that is directly connected to the Internet. 79 Access can be gained at schools, businesses, libraries, or storefront "computer coffee shops." s Individuals can also gain access to 71 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1996) . The Internet was created as an experimental project of the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) in the late 1960s. ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET USER'S GUIDE AND CATALOG 13 (2d ed. 1994). This system, dubbed ARPANET, linked computers owned by the military, defense contractors, and university laboratories engaged in military research. Id at 13. The purpose of the network was to "rapidly transmit[] communications without direct human involvement or control, and with the automatic ability to re-route communications if one or more individual links were damaged or otherwise unavailable," perhaps due to war. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831. As ARPANET eventually grew to include universities, corporations, and individuals worldwide, the network became known as the DARPA Internet and ultimately the Internet. Id. the Internet through noncommercial Internet service providers or commercial online services, which allow users to dial in to a local telephone number and connect their personal computers to the Internet. 8 ' After connecting to the Internet, users may communicate with each other using a variety of methods. 8 2 One-to-one messaging (such as e-mail) allows a sender to address and transmit a .message to one or more people 5 One-to-many messaging (such as listserv) allows a person to subscribe to a mailing list and receive messages that are forwarded to subscribers.'" Likewise, a recipient's reply to the message can be viewed by all the subscribers. Distributed message databases (such as USENET newsgroups) are similar to listservs, except that a user need not subscribe to the database; he or she may access it at any time. 6 Real time communication (such as Internet Relay Chat, or IRC), rather than fora where messages are posted and later read, allows users to converse in an immediate dialogue with other users. 7 Real time remote computer utilization (such as telnet) provides users with the resources of remote computers in real time, for such purposes as browsing a distant library's card catalogue.
Remote information retrieval, perhaps the most familiar means of Internet communication, allows users to search for and retrieve information located on remote computers. 9 There are three basic methods of locating and retrieving information on the Internet. 9° File transfer protocol (ftp) lists the names of computer files on remote computers and transfers those files to a local computer. 9 There is currently no effective way to determine the age or identity of a user accessing material through e-mail, listservs, newsgroups, or chat rooms. 0 5 Further, even if technology were available to block the access of minors to these fora, there is no method by which the creators of newsgroups which contain discussions of art, politics or any other subject that could potentially elicit "indecent" contributions could limit the blocking of access by minors to such "indecent" material and still allow them access to the remaining content, even if the overwhelming majority of that content was not indecent.' 6 However, current technology does enable the operator of a World Wide Web server to limit access by minors. 07 A Web document can include a fill-in-the-blank form that requests information from a would-be viewer of the Web site. 08 The Government contended that the CDA creates three affirmative defenses for all content providers: credit card verification; adult verification by password or identification number; and "tagging." 10 At present, none of these proposals is feasible, for either technological or practical reasons."' III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Immediately after President Clinton signed the Communications Decency Act into law on February 8, 1996, twenty plaintiffs" 2 brought suit against United States Attorney General Janet Reno and the United States Justice Department challenging the constitutionality of two of its provisions."3 The plaintiffs alleged that the provisions conflicted with the free speech clause of the First Amendment.1 4 One week later, Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entered a temporary restraining order against use an online age verification system that requires cgi script because the server software of the online services available to subscribers cannot process cgi scripts. There is no method currently available for Web page publishers who lack access to cgi scripts to screen recipients for age. Id. at 845-46. See supra note 108. While it is quite common for "adult" Web sites to require information from their visitors, "a modest number of freely accessible Web sites containing hard core pornography still exist on the Web." Bilstad, supra note 69, at 339. "0 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 846. See Brief for Appellant at 34-38, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 Ct. (1997 . Tagging requires content providers to label all "indecent" or "patently offensive" material by imbedding a string of characters, such as "XXX," in the Web site's address or program. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
CYBERPORITAND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
enforcement of § 223(a) (1) (B) (ii) as it applies to indecent communications, based upon a finding that the term "indecent" was too vague to support a criminal prosecution. 5 A second action was subsequently initiated by an additional twenty-seven plaintiffs, 6 and the cases were consolidated for a hearing before a threejudge district court.1 7
At the parties' urging, extensive evidentiary hearings were held," 8 which, combined with a detailed stipulation between the parties, allowed the district court to make findings as to the nature and history of the Internet, and the existence and accessibility of pornography on the Internet. 9 Significantly, the court found that " [c] Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any civil action challenging the constitutionality, on its face, or this title or any amendment made by this title, or any provision thereof, shall be heard by a district court of 3 judges convened pursuant to the provisions of section 2284 of title 28, United States Code. 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (1996) .
The court consisted of Chief Circuit Judge Sloviter of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and Judges Buckwalter and Dalzell of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
"1 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996) . computer programs 22 to block out pornographic material, at present there is no reliable method to shield minors from pornography that is not economically prohibitive to some users and providers.
With each judge filing a separate opinion, the three-judge district court unanimously found that the CDA's references to "indecent" and "patently offensive" conduct were inherently vague, and therefore found the statute facially unconstitutional. 124
A. CHIEFJUDGE SLOVITER'S OPINION Chief Judge Dolores K. Sloviter was skeptical of a strong governmental interest in regulating the wide realm of online material that possibly could fall within the purview of the CDA, but recognized that there is a "compelling" interest with respect to certain material. 25 Notwithstanding this concern, she found that the scope of material regulated by the CDA was so broad as to create a chilling effect.
126 Furthermore, she stated that the terms "patently offensive" and "indecent" are so vague as to be incapable of application. 27 Thus, material deemed indecent in one region of the country may not be regarded as such in another. 128 She also stated that the affirmative defenses established " Examples of software released in recent years to limit Internet access to children include: Cyber Patrol; CYBERsitter; The Internet Filter;, Net Nanny; Parental Guidance; SurfWatch; Netscape Proxy Server; and WebTrack. Id. at 839-42. These programs do not appear to please everyone-the ACLU has threatened suit against Kern County, California unless the county removes a program on library computers that blocks access to adult-oriented sights. ACLU Protests Libray's Use of Filtering Software, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB.,Jan. 27, 1998, at 11. 123 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 849. 128 Id. at 852-53 (Sloviter, C.J.). Judge Sloviter gave as an example the Broadway play Angels in America, which won two Tony Awards and a Pulitzer prize. Id. at 852-53. This play dealt with homosexuality and AIDS in "graphic language" and could be considered unacceptable for children under 18-years-old in "less cosmopolitan communities." Id. at 853. However, Judge Sloviter commented that uninhibited teachers and parents might find it acceptable for 1lth or 12th graders. Id. Similarly, articles on female genital mutilation, a routine practice in some countries, might be viewed as patently offensive in some communities, even if presented in context. Id. Judge Sloviter further commented that non-obscene material, such as photographs in National Geographic of Indian sculptures depicting copulation, a written description of a prison rape, or Francesco Clemente's painting Labirinth, might easily fall within the
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by § 223(e) (5) are not "technologically or economically feasible for most providers"-rejecting the Government's position that providers can avoid liability by "tagging" their material to allow potential readers to screen out unwanted material 1 2 Chief Judge Sloviter also refused to narrowly construe the CDA as only applying to commercial pornographers.s B. JUDGE BUCKWALTER'S OPINION Judge Buckwalter found the terms "indecent" in § 223 (a) (1) (B) and "patently offensive" and "in context" in § 223(d) (1) so vague that their enforcement would violate the "fundamental constitutional principle" of "simple fairness," 1s 1 as well as the First and Fifth Amendments.
32 He found that the Government's assertion that § § 223(a) and (d) would be applied only to "pornographic" materials was lacking in statutory support, and commented that, unlike obscenity, "indecency has not been defined to exclude works of serious literary, artistic, 11133 political or scientific value.
Additionally, Judge Buckwalter stated that the Government's argument that the material must be patently offensive when considered "in context" did little to dispel the statute's vagueness. The relevant context might be "the nature of the communication as a whole, the time of day it was conveyed, the medium used, the identity of the speaker, or whether or not it is accompanied by appropriate warnings. ' ' The vagueness of the statute, he commented, is aggravated by the distinctive qualities of the Internet.'*" prohibitory language of 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1). Id. She stated that the Government presented no evidence before the three-judge panel that "it has a compelling interest in preventing a seventeen-year-old minor from accessing such images." Id.
'29 Id. at 856 (Sloviter, CJ.). ', Id. at 854-55 (Sloviter, C.J.). Commercial pornographers are those who post sexually explicit material on the Internet for profit, and typically require a would-be viewer to input his or her credit card information before accessing such material. He expounded upon the dangers of regulating speech on the Internet, including the squelching of protected speech among a significant number of people.
13 7 He stated that, ironically, this same regulation would have little effect on the commercial pornographers about whom Congress is most concerned.ss Judge Dalzell noted that most Websites operated by these individuals already have the safeguards enumerated in § 223(e) (5).9 Thus, according to Judge Dalzell, the Supreme Court's First Amendment case law required a "medium-specific" approach to judicial analysis of the regulation of mass communication. "° Because the Internet is the "most participatory form of mass speech yet developed,"' ' 1 it is entitled to "the highest protection from governmental intrusion."
From the district court's unanimous ruling that the CDA was unconstitutionally vague and infringed on the right to free form national standard of content regulation? The Government offered no evidence of any such national standard or nationwide consensus as to what would be considered "patently offensive. " Id. at 863 (BuckwalterJ. 490, 500-01 (1981); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ).
141 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883 (Dalzell, J.) . Four related characteristics of Internet communication have a transcendent importance to our shared holding that the CDA is unconstitutional on its face.... First, the Internet presents very low barriers to entry. Second, these barriers to entry are identical for both speakers and listeners. Third, as a result of these low barriers, astoundingly diverse content is available on the Internet. Fourth, the Internet provides significant access to all who wish to speak in the medium, and even creates a relative parity among speakers. Writing for a 7-2 majority, 14 Justice Stevens found the two challenged provisions of the Communications Decency Act, § 223(a) and § 223(d), were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and infringed upon the right to free expression. 46
Searchingfor Precedent
Justice Stevens commenced his analysis by evaluating the precedential effects of Ginsberg, Pacifica, and Renton. 4 7 The Government's attempts to analogize its case to these precedents were unconvincing to the Court. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of the court of 3 judges in an action under subsection (a) holding this title or an amendment made by this title, or any provision thereof, unconstitutional shall be reviewable as a matter of right by direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Any such appeal shall be filed not more than 20 days after entry of such judgment, decree, or order. 47 U.S.C. § 561(b) (1996) .
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996) . "'Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer joined in the majority opinion.
, 46 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 Ct. , 2334 Ct. (1997 . In contrast, the CDA operates as a complete ban on transmitting "indecent" material to anybody under eighteen years of age. Likewise, Justice Stevens found Pacifica 2 inapposite: the scope of communications addressed by the FCC's order in Pacifica was significantly narrower than that regulated by the CDA.' 5 5 The CDA sought to control all transmissions on the Internet-the most extensive communications network ever conceived-which requires a user to take several steps to access information and where there is a minimal risk of encountering unwanted material.
By comparison, in Pacifica, the FCC merely sought to restrict certain language at a certain time of day on a medium with a finite number of frequencies. 5 The Court also rejected the Government's attempt to invoke an analogy to City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.: 56 "The purpose of the CDA is to protect children from the primary effects of 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' speech, rather than any 'secondary' effect of such speech." 5 7 The ordinance in Renton, on the other hand, was aimed at preventing crime and other byproducts of adult entertainment. 58 Justice Stevens chose instead to highlight the similarities between the CDA and the statute addressed in Sable Communica- ' Id. (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646). "12 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC sanction of a patently offensive radio broadcast at a time when children were likely to be in the audience). See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text (discussing Pacifica). 153 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342. "'Justice Stevens noted that "unlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized regulation of the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a 'scarce' expressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds. " Reno, 117 S. Ct. at Justice O'Connor noted that the creation of "adult zones" has been long accepted by the states in a variety of contexts. 2 As such, she was willing to support the federal government's right to zone the Internet so long as it does not unduly restrict adult access and affects only material that minors have no First Amendment right to receive.9 She recognized that the "display" provision, as well as some applications of the "indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions, fail to comply with that limiting principle because it prevents adults from accessing constitutionally protected materials in certain circumstances. 4 Thus, in those particular circumstances only, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that she would invalidate the provisions.Y In closing, Justice O'Connor stated that she would uphold the "indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions insofar as they apply to Internet communications where the party transmitting the information knows that all of the recipients are minors. 6 V. ANALYSIS Congress has assumed a Herculean task in attempting to impose restraints on free speech over the Internet. The nature 
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and purpose of the medium is to disseminate material globally at the click of a button. At no time in history has it been so simple to transmit information to so many people at one time. While this fact makes the Internet a tremendously helpful resource, it also creates the opportunity for abuse. The wisdom of imposing restraints on speech in cyberspace is an issue this Note does not seek to address. Rather, this Note will address the Reno Court's choice of precedent, selection and application of a standard of review, and evaluation of the Government's zoning argument.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF ANALOGY
The key to the Court's analysis is the selection of an analogy-some communication medium whose characteristics are so similar to those of the Internet that it is logical that the same degree of regulation as that other medium should be employed. 197 As noted by Judge Dalzell, "The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers."' 9 8 As a new medium, the Internet seems to defy analogy to any other previously used system of information dissemination. In Reno, the Government pressed an analogy to the broadcast media discussed in Pacfica," while the plaintiffs urged an analogy to the "dial-a-porn" telephone communications in Sable. 2 The former would give Congress wide berth in regulating Internet transmissions, while the latter would place more restrictions on any proposed regulatory scheme.
The district court, while unanimous in finding the CDA unconstitutional, was unable to settle upon a specific analogy. Chief Judge Sloviter likened the Internet to a telephone system. 20 ' Implicit in this analogy is the possibility that the Internet " ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 873 (E.D. Pa. 1996 ) (Dalzell, J.) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson,J, concurring) ).
" ' FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) . See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text (discussing Pacifica).
' Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) . See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (discussing Sable).
0' "Internet communication, while unique, is more akin to telephone communication, at issue in Sab/e than to broadcasting, at issue in Pacifica, because, as with the telephone, an Internet user must act affirmatively and deliberately to retrieve specific
